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jurisdiction, the entire action shall be removed to the superior
court of the same county upon the filing by the counterclaiming
defendant of such bond as would be required for appeal to the
superior court if there were a verdict adverse to him for the full
amount of the claim by the plaintiff. The removal is mandatory
upon the filing of the bond and the superior court is to have
complete power to render any adequate verdict and judgment,.
regardless of amount.47
DANIEL

L.

BELL, JR.

Real Property-Easements-Implication from Description in Deed
The owner of a tract of land fronting on a city street conveyed out
of the tract two lots bordering on the street. One deed called for a
10-foot alley as the eastern boundary of the lot conveyed; the other
called for the alley as the western boundary. The owner later conveyed
a third lot in the rear, the deed to which described it as fronting on a
10-foot alley running from the street and between the two lots previously
conveyed. The plaintiffs, owners of the western front lot and rear
lot, brought an action to determine whether they have an easement in
the alley, since quitclaimed to defendants by heirs of the original
grantor. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that bare references
to the alley for descriptive purposes, being the only evidence of an
intent of the grantor to establish the easement, were insufficient standing
alone to create an easement by implication or otherwise.1
""The proposed statute treats the plaintiff as if he had obtained a favorable
judgment in the justice's court, and does not deprive him of any rights he has
under the present law. The only change is that a counterclaiming defendant
is now entitled to plead his claim in full provided he follows a defined procedure.
Neither does the statute deprive the justice's courts of jurisdiction in any
case. The effect of "exclusive original jurisdiction" in contract actions, where
the amount of the plaintiff's demand is less than $200.00, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7-22
(1953), is unchanged: no superior court can acquire jurisdiction, except on appeal or removal from a justice. See also N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7-21 (1953) (concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court in other actions where amount claimed
is less than $50). See N. C. CoNsr. Art. IV, § 27 (as changed 1875) : "The
several Justices of the Peace shall have jurisdiction, under such regulations as
the General Assembly shall prescribe, of civil actions, founded on contract, wherein the sum demanded shall not exceed two hundred dollars (The Constitutional
Convention of 1875 changed "exclusive original jurisdiction" to "jurisdiction.")

... And the General Assembly may give to the justice of the Peace jurisdiction
of other civil actions wherein the value of the property in controversy does not
exceed fifty dollars . . . The party against whom the judgment is given may
appeal to the superior court from the same."
The reference to
1 Green v. Barbee, 238 N. C. 77, 76 S.E. 2d 307 (1953).
the alley in the deed to the plaintiffs' front lot was: "Beginning at a 10-foot
alley on . . . comer . . . thence in an east direction 105 feet to a stake on a 10foot alley to the beginning. . . ." The reference in the defendants' deed was:

" .west

210 feet to an alley; thence with the east side of said alley north

210 feet to
supra.

. . .

line...

"

Transcript of Record, pp. 17-18, Green v. Barbee,

1954]

NOTES AND COMMENT

The court determined: (1) that the alley was not a way of necessity to either of the front lots at the time they were originally conveyed,
since they fronted on a street; (2) that there was no allegation that
the alleyway was the only means of access to the rear lot when it was
originally conveyed; and (3) that there was no allegation that, at the
time of the original conveyance, "the use of the alley had been so long
continued and so obvious or manifest as to show that it was meant
to be permanent; or that the easement was necessary to the beneficial
enjoyment of the lot conveyed, . . . as being essential to the creation

12
of an easement upon the severance of an estate."
Facts similar to those in the principal case arose in Milliken v.
Denny," a prior North Carolina case, in which it was held that the
mere description of land in a deed as bounded by an alley was not
sufficient to create an easement in such alley. The court there ruled
that the language in the deed did not estop the grantor from closing
the alley, and that the testimony at the trial left nothing to guide them
as to the grantor's intention save the deed itself, thus inferring that
the grantor's intention would control if it could be determined. It was
also noted that there was no evidence that the alley affected the value
of the property, or that there was any declaration of easement by the
grantors. In Harrisv. Carter,4 where plaintiff's land had been bounded
on a public road which was later discontinued, the defendants were
held to be equitably estopped from obstructing the road, but the court
relied on the fact that buildings were erected, business was being conducted, and that the value of the lot would be seriously impaired by an
obstruction of the road.
Jurisdictions other than North Carolina generally hold that where
land is conveyed by deed describing it as bounded by a street or way,
an easement in the street or way passes to the grantee by implication
of law.5 The easement so created is usually based on the theory that

2 Green v. Barbee, 238 N. C. 77, 81, 76 S.E. 2d 307, 310 (1953).
'141 N. C. 224, 225, 53 S.E. 867, 868 (1906), the court stated: "...
the
mere fact that the deed . . . called for 'a stone,' thence north 84 degrees and 22
minutes west 340 feet along the south side of the ten-foot alley, was not per se
sufficient to impose an easement upon the ten feet of land referred to as an alley,
which passed to the owners of the lot conveyed."
'189 N. C. 295, 127 S.E. 1 (1925).
' Malone v. Jones, 211 Ala. 461, 100 So. 831 (1924); Crute v. Hyatt, 220
Ark. 537, 249 S.W. 2d 116 (1952); Petitpierre v. Maguire, 155 Cal. 242, 100
Pac. 690 (1909) ; Hamil v. Pone, 160 Ga. 774, 129 S.E. 94 (1925) ; Iseringhausen
v. Larcade, 147 La. 515, 85 So. 224 (1920); Teal v. Jagielo, 327 Mass. 156, 97
N.E. 2d 421 (1951); Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 89 N.E. 2d 8 (1949) ;
Haab v. Moorman, 332 Mich. 126, 50 N.W. 2d 856 (1952); Carlin v. Paul, 11
Mo. 32 (1847); McPherson v. Monegan, 120 Mont. 454, 187 P. 2d 542 (1947);
Lindsay v. Jones, 21 Nev. 72, 25 Pac. 297 (1890); Hughes v. Lippincott, 56
N. M. 473, 245 P. 2d 390 (1952); In re Thirty-First (Patterson) Ave., 152
Misc. 849, 273 N. Y. Supp. 757 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ; Walters v. Smith, 186 Va. 159,
41 S.E. 2d 617 (1947). For a collection of cases, see 2 THOMPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 479 n. 25 (Perm. Ed. 1939).
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having so described the land as bounded by a way, the grantor and
those claiming under him are estopped to deny the existence of such a
way or the grantee's rights therein. 6 Some courts hold the easement
passes by implied grant, without relying on estoppel, 7 and the rationale
of estoppel has been criticized as improperly applied to create this
type of easement.8 It has been stated however, that it is immaterial
whether the easement operates "as an implied grant, covenant, warranty, or estoppel"; the question is whether the way was intended by
the grantor as a boundary of the land conveyed. 9
Where the street or way is not designated as a boundary but is
referred to only for the purpose of description, the general rule does
not apply, and no easement will be found, 10 as where the way is only
coincident with the line described, the reference to the way having been
made for the purpose of description "as any other mark or monument
might have been referred to."'" Nor does the rule apply where the
description is false, 12 where the grantor does not own the fee in the
8

See note 5 supra.

'E.g., Tursi v. Parry, 135 Pa. Super. 285, 5 A. 2d 399 (1939), where the
court also recognized authority holding that there was an implied covenant that

a way existed as described in the conveyance and would be continued for the
use of the grantee and those claiming under him.
Some of the cases mention both estoppel and an implied covenant as the basis
for the rule: E.g., Petitpierre v. Maguire, 155 Cal. 242, 100 Pac. 690 (1909);
Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 89 N.E. 2d 8 (1949). See 3 TIFFANY, RnAL
PROPERTY § 799, p. 307 (3rd ed., Jones, 1939), where it is said: "The statement . . that the reference to a street involves an 'implied covenant' on the part
of the grantor that there is such a street, appears ordinarily to mean merely that
he is precluded from denying the existence of the street."

' See discussion in 3

POWELL, REAL PROPERTY

§ 409, p. 412 (1952), where it

is stated: "The fact remains, that the easement exists because of the combined
effect of a pegphrase in the conveyance and of the circumstances of the conveyance. It is, therefore, understandable that some courts speak of such an
easement as arising from 'implication.' It is neither accurate nor useful to
speak of these easements as created by 'dedication' or by 'estoppel.'"
'Lankin v. Terwilliger, 22 Ore. 97, 100, 29 Pac. 268, 269 (1892), where the
court says that the easement "rests upon the fact that the grantor, by describing
the land as bounded by a way . . . intends thereby to confer upon the grantee,
as appurtenant to the granted premises, the right to use such way. . ..
The easement so sought is to be distinguished from easements arising by
implication of law as ways of necessity. Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 89
N.E. 2d 8 (1949). It is also to be distinguished from easements arising where
there is an existing use at the time of severance of the estate. Hughes v. Lippincott, 56 N. M. 473, 245 P. 2d 390 (1952).
10 Bates v. Johnson, 217 Ky. 673, 290 S.W. 474 (1927) ; Lankin v. Terwilliger,
22 Ore. 97, 29 Pac. 268 (1892); see Malone v. Jones, 211 Ala. 461, 100 So.
831 (1924) ; Talbert v. Mason, 136 Iowa 373, 113 N.W. 918 (1907).
" Lankin v. Terwilliger, 22 Ore. 97, 102, 29 Pac. 268, 270 (1892). The deed
described the land by metes and bounds: ". .. commencing at a point on the
west side of the country road at the . . . corner of . . . the 'Old Cemetary,' . . .
thence with the meander of said road. . . ." See Talbert v. Mason, 136 Iowa
373, 113 N.W. 918 (1907); cf. Bates v. Johnson, 217 Ky. 673, 290 S.W. 474
(1927) (To a point "near" a road and running "just below" a road, held a
reference for the purpose of description).
1 Teasley v. Stanton, 136 Ala. 641, 33 So. 823 (1903).
The description by
courses and distances showed the lot was 105 feet distant from the "reserve"

NOTES AND COMMENT
way, 13 or where there are "peculiar facts and circumstances" ;14 but
the fact that the land was bounded by the "side" of a road is not such
an exception, and an easement will be found. 15
The principal case16 would thus seem to indicate that North Carolina is contra the general rule, and does not recognize an easement
where land is described in the deed as being bounded by a way. The
court holds in effect that the intention of the grantor was to mention
the alley only for descriptive purposes. And though a reference only
for descriptive purposes is an exception to the rule,17 the court speaks
of the deed as calling for an alley as a boundary of the lot conveyed,
and this type of description falls within the general rule. In the opinion
of the court in the Green case18 neither the general rule nor the principle
of estoppel were referred to, although the court did recognize that there
was authority elsewhere running contrary to their holding.
The principal case, as well as Milliken v. Denny,19 indicates that
the reference to an alley in a deed, bounding the lot conveyed by the
alley, will not suffice to create an easement by implication, nor will it
estop the grantor and those claiming under him from closing the alley,
but that there must be something in addition, showing an intention on
the part of the grantor to create an easement. 20 That the court would
apply estoppel even if it were shown that the grantee bought the land
on the representation that there was a right of way, and that the value
of the land was affected by the alley as an easement, seems doubtful
where the facts are such as are involved in the principal case, since
the defendants there ostensibly had no notice of any representation
on which it was fronted in the deed. No implied covenant arose, the description
being false.
See Talbert v. Mason, 136 Iowa 373, 113 N.W. 918 (1907).
4
, 37
I1n re Opening One Hundred and Sixteenth Street, 1 App. Div. 436, N. Y. Supp. 508, 516 (1st Dep't 1896), where the "conveyance of a comparatively
small triangular piece of land did not grant as an appurtenance to it the beneficial use of a piece of property many times its size and value, and all for the
consideration of one dollar."
" Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 89 N.E. 2d 8 (1949). It was held that
such a description was just as effective to pass an easement as one bounding
the land "by or on" a way although the rule had been held not to apply in an
earlier Massachusetts case, McKenzie v. Gleason, 184 Mass. 452, 69 N.E. 1076
(1904), where the land was bounded by the "side" of a road.
(1953).
18 Green v. Barbee, 238 N. C. 77, 76 S.E. 2d 307
',

See note 10 mpra.

",Green v. Barbee, 238 N. C. 77, 76 S.E. 2d 307 (1953).
10 141 N. C. 224, 53 S.E. 867 (1906).

"0In North Carolina, when the grantor sells lots with reference to a plat or
map on which there are streets and alleys laid out, he and those claiming under
him are held to be estopped to deny the existence of an easement in the alley and
the right of the grantee to use it. Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N. C. 227, 25 S.E.
2d 889 (1943). See Note, 31 N. C. L. RLv. 202 (1953).
See 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 409 (1952), where easements created by the
general rule and those passing by reference to a plat or map are discussed jointly
and correlated to the same principle.
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In view of these decisions, reliance

should not be placed on a description in a deed of a way as a boundary,
and perhaps the advice given in Milliken v. Denny should be followed:
"If purchasers wish to acquire a right of way or other easement over
other lands of their grantor, it is very easy to have it so declared in
the deed of conveyance." 21
CALVIN C. WALLACE

State Torts Claims Act-Right of Subrogation'
Does the right of subrogation exist under the provisions of the
"Tort Claims against State Departments and Agencies Act" ?2 This
question was recently answered affirmatively by the North Carolina
2 141 N. C. 224, 231, 53 S.E. 867, 870 (1906).
1The purpose of this note is not a detailed discussion of either subrogation or
Tort Claims Acts but is merely to bring an important decision interpreting the
Tort Claims Act of North Carolina to the attention of legal profession.
For a discussion of the Federal Tort Claims Act see, Baer, Suing Uncle Sam
in Tort, 26 N. C. L. REv. 119 (1948) ; Fisher, The Federal Tort Clains Act after
Five Years, 3 MEacER L. REv. 263 (1952) ; Hiley, A Review of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 14 GA. B. J. 301 (1952) ; Jackson, The Tort Clains Act-The Federal Government Assumes Liability in Tort, 27 Nim. L. Rnv. 30 (1947) ; Woolston,
Federal Tort Claims Act Digest, 28 DICTA 143 (1951); Note, 4 Wyo. L. 3. 96
(1949) ; Comments, 42 ILL. L. Rnv. 344 (1947), 56 YALE L. J. 534 (1947).
For a comparison of the Federal Act and the English Act see Street, Tort
Liability of the State: The Federal Tort Claims Act and The Crown; Proceedings Act, 47- MIcH. L. Rxv. 341 (1949).
See generally for discussions of tort liability of various states, Oberst, The
Board of Claims Act of 1950, 39 Ky. L. J. 35 (1950) (Kentucky) ; Troxell,
Tort Responsibility of the District of Columbia, 19 B. A. D. C. 504 (1952) (District of Columbia); Note, 8 MONT. L. REv. 45 and 97 (1947) (Montana); Comments, 23 IND. L. Rry. 468 (1948) (Indiana), 47 N. W. U. L. Rv. 914 (1953)
(Illinois), 90 OHIO St. L. J. 501 (1948) (Ohio), 23 So CALIF. L. REv. 507 (1950)
(California), 27 TEx. L. REv. 337 (1949) (Texas).
Also see Borchard, Tort Claims agabist Government: Municipal, State and
Federal Liability, 3 A. B. A. J. 221 (1947); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability,
48 MICH. L. Rtv. 41 (1949).
In regard to subrogation generally, see, Gleason and Intrater, A New Trend
it Subrogation, 38 Gao. L. J. 646 (1950) ; Mullen, The Equitable Doctrine of
Slebrogation, 3 MD. L. Ray. 201 (1939). Also, see generally, 50 Al. Jun. Subrogation §§ 1-147 (1944).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to 143-300 (1952). The pertinent section, N. C.
GEIN. STAT. § 143-291 (1952), reads in material part as follows: "The State
Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the purpose of hearing
and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of Education, the State
Highway and Public Works Commission, and all other departments, institutions,
and agencies of the State. The Industrial Commission shall determine whether
or not each individual claim arose as a result of a negligent act of a State employee while acting within the scope of his employment and without contributory
negligence on the part of the claimant or the person in whose behalf the claim is
asserted. If the Commission finds that there was such negligence on the part of
a State employee while acting within the scope of his employment proximately
causing the injury and no contributory negligence on the part of the claimant
or person in whose behalf the claim is asserted, the Commission shall determine
the amount of damages the claimant is entitled to be paid, including medical and

other expenses ....

but damage awarded shall not exceed $8,000."

For a summary of the North Carolina Act see, A Survey of Statutory Changes
hi North Carolina in 1951, 29 N. C. L. Ray. 351, 416 (1951).

